East Asia: A New Balancing Game?

East Asia: A New Balancing Game?


Amitav Acharya


If media reports and reviews by pundits are to be believed, a new balancing game is in full swing in Asia. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh completed a week-long visit around the region, covering Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam, attending the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Hanoi on October 30th. Ostensibly highlighting India’s “Look East” Policy, Singh’s trip was nonetheless read by many as a sign of Delhi’s balancing policy towards China. Beginning 27th October, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton embarked on a seven-country, two-week “circle the Pacific” tour, covering Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and Australia, with a brief stopover in China’s Hainan island. The occasion of her visit was also the EAS, to which the US (along with Russia) had been invited for the first time. And on 7 November, President Obama himself joined in, with a visit to India, Indonesia, South Korea and Japan.

For the Chinese media, these may as well be called the “encirclement” policy. An editorial in People’s Daily, asked,: “Does India’s ‘Look East’ Policy Mean ‘Look to Encircle China’?” And writing in the Newsweek Magazine on November 9th, Denis Macshane, a former British Foreign Office official, found “Washington playing balance-of-power politics” in Asia.

Indeed, the very decision to invite the US, Russia, Australian and India to what had originally been conceived as an East Asian only (i.e. East Asia without Caucasians or Indians) Summit was made by the ASEAN countries in order to avoid a Chinese dominance of the EAS.

To be sure, the participation of the US in the EAS was already foreordained since it acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009. India’s “Look East” policy is at least a decade old and would have been inconceivable without its growing economic dynamism. The timing of Obama’s Asia visit had more to do with his domestic travails than his foreign policy challenges. While preventing Chinese dominance over regional bodies is a clear goal of China’s neighbours, it does not justify viewing the expanded membership of the EAS primarily as a balancing game.

But what gives the recent visits by Indian and US officials a special significance is the growing misgiving in the region about China’s recent behaviour, including its declaration of the South China Sea as a “core interest”, its harsh criticism of Japan over its arrest of a Chinese fisherman near the disputed Senkau/Daiyutai islands, and its summary dismissal of any US role in these regional disputes. To many in Washington at least, China’s “charm offensive” and “soft power” diplomacy has now given way to “Chinese assertiveness”, or even big power bullying.

This may be overstating the case. Chinese started participating in multilateral institutions in Asia in the 1990s to counter the talk around the region of a “China threat”. The truth (now as it was then) is that China cannot exclude the US from regional bodies, or having a say over regional matters, since no country in the region, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN members included, would accept it. Such a strategy is sure to backfire by drawing its neighbours, including ASEAN, tighter around the US. China can try to divide and rule ASEAN, by prevailing upon some members to accept its line on regional issues. But even Burma and Cambodia (one of the countries visited by Clinton), despite the large sums they receive from China, are unlikely to place all their eggs in the Chinese basket.

So if China thought it can get away by talking (if not acting) tough and trying to keep America out of regional matters, it has badly miscalculated. The diplomatic gains China might have made over the past decade through its “charm offensive” now risk quickly dissipating, unless Beijing shows more maturity and restraint. Moreover, China will do well to realize that interdependence means its actions in one part of Asia will reverberate in other parts. So how it deals with Japan over the East China Sea islands would matter to ASEAN. Similarly, acting tough with ASEAN over the South China Sea islands will matter to all countries.

But a big mystery in all this is this: who is calling the shots in China's policy towards its neighbours? Outsiders generally think of China as a communist monolith. But China is increasingly complex, as most countries undergoing rapid economic change tend to be. One explanation for Beijing’s recent assertiveness is that China’s sudden global prominence in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis has gone into its head or at least caused policy confusion about how to “lead”. Another is that there is a growing rift between the military and the civilian leadership over issues of critical foreign policy issues. Few years ago, a senior PLA official had told this author that it was not happy about Beijing’s apparent “concession” by agreeing with ASEAN on a Declaration on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. The Foreign Ministry, which is most supportive of regional cooperation, now seems to have been sidelined. And if the PLA is unhappy, the communist party has to show understanding at a time of transition to a new leadership.

(The author is Professor of international relations at American University, Washington, D.C. and Chair of its ASEAN Studies Center. He is also a Senior Fellow of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada).
This article appeared in Canada-Asia Viewpoints, Nov 12, 2010
http://76.74.246.164/editorials/canada-asia-viewpoints/editorials/east-asia-new-balancing-game

Amitav Acharya, "Asia is Not One"

The November 2010 issue of Journal of Asian Studies "opens with a wide-ranging exchange that explores competing visions of the interconnections among Asian countries and the meaning of “Asia” as a region."

Amitav Acharya, "Asia is Not One," Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4 (November) 2010: 1001–1013.


ASIA IS NOT “one,” and there is no singular idea of Asia. Asia is of multiple (although not always mutually exclusive) conceptions, some drawing on material forces, such as economic growth, interdependence, and physical power, and others having ideational foundations, such as civilizational linkages and normative aspirations. Some of these varied conceptions of Asia have shaped in meaningful ways the destinies of its states and peoples. Moreover, they have underpinned different forms of regionalism, which, in turn, has ensured that Asia, despite its fuzziness and incoherence, has remained a durable, if essentially contested, notion.....

Other contributions to the debate are:

Asia Redux: Conceptualizing a Region for Our Times false
Prasenjit Duara

The Idea of Asia and Its Ambiguities false
Wang Hui

The Intricacies of Premodern Asian Connections false
Tansen Sen

Response to Prasenjit Duara, “Asia Redux” false
Barbara Watson Andaya

No gears shifting. false
Rudolf Mrázek

Response to Comments on “Asia Redux” false
Prasenjit Duara

Debating Asia's Meaning: A Journal of Asian Studies Symposium

This issue of JAS "opens with a wide-ranging exchange that explores competing visions of the interconnections among Asian countries and the meaning of “Asia” as a region." Below is the essay by Amitav Acharya, "Asia is Not One", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4 (November) 2010: 1001–1013.

 

Asia Is Not One:

Regionalism and the Ideas of Asia

Amitav Acharya

Asia is not “one”, as Okakura Kazuo (1904) had once argued, and there is no singular idea of Asia. Asia is of multiple (although not always mutually exclusive) conceptions, some drawing upon material forces, such as economic growth, interdependence and physical power, others having ideational foundations, such as civilizational linkages and normative aspirations. Some of these varied conceptions of Asia have shaped in meaningful ways the destinies of its states and peoples. Moreover, they have underpinned different forms of  regionalism, which in turn has ensured that Asia, despite its fuzziness and incoherence, has remained a durable if essentially contested notion.

Before proceeding further, let me briefly comment on the concepts of region, regionalization and regionalism, the three central pillars of any meaningful discussion of the contemporary idea of Asia.[1] First, our understanding of what makes a region has undergone a major change. There is a growing agreement in the literature that: (1) regions are not just material constructs but also ideational ones; (2) regions are not a given or fixed, but are socially constructed- they are made and remade through political, economic social and cultural interactions; and (3) just like nations states, regions may rise and wither.[2]

In his discussion of the pre-World War II period, Duara sets “imperial regionalism” against the “anti-imperialist regionalization project in Asia”. While I agree, I also believe that the anti-imperialist project, which persisted well into the post-war period, was not singular as a source of Asianness and Asianism. The trajectory of Asian regionalism had varied underpinnings which need to be recognized. While Duara focuses on Tagore, Tenshin and Zhang Taiyan, I bring in Aung San, Ho Chih Minh, and Jose Rizal. The richness and diversity of the Asian idea cannot be fully captured without looking at these Southeast Asian proponents, for it was in Southeast Asia that Asian regionalism took its most decisive shape.

Contested Visions

While “Asia” has not lacked protagonists for the past century and half, these protagonists have differed widely in terms of their normative beliefs and political goals. Looking at the champions of Asia and their ideas, at least four different conceptions of Asia can be identified in the early post Second World War period. These may be termed as Imperialist Asia, Nationalist Asia, Universalist Asia, and Regionalist Asia. A fifth conception, Exceptionalist Asia, though already incipient, was would emerge later as a major political force later.

These categories are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, elements and impulses within these categories may be present to different degrees in a single proponent of Asia. Thus, while Jawaharlal Nehru of India belonged primarily to Nationalist Asia, he also identified with Universalist Asia (or at least an internationalist) and Regionalist Asia. Moreover, these impulses can shift during the course of a political career, and a lifetime.

The first conception, Imperialist Asia (similar to Duara’s “imperial regionalism”), is tied to the hegemonic purpose of great powers, both Western and Asian. While the term Asia did not originate with it, Western colonial rule, even though it severely disrupted existing intra-regional commercial traffic, and helped to divide Asia into different spheres of influence, did contribute to the reification of the concept, thereby furthering the cultural and political dichotomy that had developed between Europe and Asia through the centuries, well before the “consciousness of an Asian identity originated [within Asia] largely in reaction to the colonial system and in the common denominator of anti-Western sentiment.” (Steadman 1969: 32-3),

But it was in the hands of an Asian power, Japan, that the imperialist notion of Asia assumed a peculiar prominence, as imperial Japan and its apologists sought to invoke a discourse of pan-Asianism to legitimize its dominance in a way that Western powers in the region had not and other Asian powers such as China and India would not. The dual role of Japan as Asia’s savior and its hegemonic leader was clearly illustrated in the Japanese notion of a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Encompassing Japan (including the territories of Korea, Taiwan, and Sakhalin), China, Manchukuo, French Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies, this was of course not all of Asia, but the “the concept built on Pan-Asian notions of an “Asian community” that had earlier developed in Japan, and which would be extended to Southeast Asian and South Asian if not on the basis of race, then on the basis of a “common interest”. (Duus, 2008: 146-7) Indeed, representatives from all over Asia were invited to the Greater East Asia Conference held in November 1943 (Duus, 2008: 151-2)

Although it was but one element among Japanese pan-Asianism, it had the most serious impact on the destinies of Asian states and the lives of their peoples. This was a concept of hegemonic region and regionalism. While it offered a platform for organizing the unity of those incorporated into it, it was not always on a voluntary basis, but coerced. The Japanese Imperialist Region was marked by a high degree of trade interdependence, and it certainly inspired freedom struggles all over Asia. But in political terms, it degenerated into another form of foreign dominance, no less oppressive than that of the Western colonial powers. Burma’s Aung San, who had earlier endorsed the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and even envisioned “a common defence policy in East Asia as the best guarantee for the maintenance of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” (Silverstein, 1972: 21), now insisted that “a new Asian order…will not and must not be one like the Co-prosperity Sphere of militarist Japan, nor should it be another Asiatic Monroe doctrine, nor imperial preference or currency bloc.” (Silverstein, 1972: 101)

The legacy of Imperialist Asia would have a long-term effect, shaping regional perceptions of the superpower rivalry during the Cold War. The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, although not outrightly imperial, was perceived as an attempt at neo-colonial domination by some sections in Asia, including India’s Nehru and Indonesia’s Sukarno. It did not last very long, but helped to polarize Asia along the Cold War divide, probably disrupting the socialization of China (along with other issues, including the Korean War, Taiwan issue and China’s own support for communist movements in the region).

Even before Japanese imperialism swept through Asia, there had emerged another conception of Asia that may be termed Universalist Asia. Its most eloquent proponent was Rabindranath Tagore, who combined a visceral distaste for nationalism with a passionate belief in the “common bond of spiritualism” among Asia’s peoples. (Tagore 1918) Although Tagore did not specifically advocate a political regionalism of states, this might have been premature given that Asia was still firmly under colonial rule, his recognition and intellectual promotion of the spiritual and civilizational affinities among Asia’s peoples constituted an alternative conception of Asian regionalism in which societies rather than states take the centre stage and which thrives as much as on ideational and cultural flows as on economic links or political purpose. Tagore was not alone in articulating a conception of Asia that was not premised on a narrow state-centric nationalism; Karl has analyzed an alternative form of regionalism, much more politically oriented that Tagore’s, among Chinese intellectuals “rooted in non-state centered practices and non-national-chauvinist culturalism”, that could be contrasted with Sun Yat-sen’s “state-based, anti-imperialist vision of Asia.” (Karl 1998:1096-97) This alternative regionalism that Karl speaks of was centered around the ideas and associates of Chinese intellectual Liang Qichao, and the activities of a little known organization called the Asian Solidarity Society set up in Tokyo in 1907 by Chinese intellectuals, Japanese socialists, and Indian, Vietnamese and Filippino exiles.  An interesting aspect of this regionalism was the recognition accorded to the “first Filipino” Jose Rizal as “the quintessential Asian patriot, from which China and other Asian must learn”. (Karl 1998: 1106) Although Rizal is better known as a champion of the unity of the Malay race, his message was appropriated by the non-state centric variety of Asian regionalism.

Tagore’s innate universalism put him at odds with the powerful currents of nationalism sweeping Asia, including in the very places the poet visited in his voyages through Asia, and which he imagined as being integral to his conception of Asia. This is not to say that the proponents of a third conception of Asia, which I call Nationalist Asia, were untouched by universalist values and instincts. Leaders such as Nehru, Aung San, and Sukarno saw little contradiction between nationalism and international cooperation. As Aung San put it, “I recognise both the virtues and limitations of pure nationalism, I love its virtues, I don’t allow myself to be blinded by its limitations, though I knew that it is not easy for the great majority of any nation to get over these limitations.”(Aung San 1974: 193) Aung San’s nationalism, like those of Nehru and Sukarno, could support both nationalism and internationalism, but these figures from Asia’s new power elite did not empathize with Universalist Asia at the expense of nationalism.

This third vision of Asia, championed by Asia’s nationalist leaders such as China’s Sun Yat-sen, India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, Burma’s Aung San, and Vietnam’s Ho Chih Minh, was geared to harnessing Asia’s rejuvenation to further the retreat of Western colonialism. Before World War II, especially around the time of the 1927 Congress of the Oppressed Nationalities, a number of leaders within the Indian National Congress (a group that was believed to include Mohandas Gandhi and C.R Das and later Nehru) had supported the idea of an “Asian federation” to organize joint struggle against Western colonialism. (Keenleyside 1982: 216) Regionalism in this sense was not only compatible with, but also a bulwark for, Asia’s restoration and rejuvenation. (Acharya, 2000) Certainly Ho Chi Minh was keen to use regional cooperation to further the cause of Vietnamese independence. (Goscha, 1999: 244) In a speech to welcome Sarat Chandra Bose, brother of Subhas Chandra Bose at the City Hall of Rangoon on July 24, 1946, Aung San stated that Burma would “stand for an Asiatic Federation in a not very, very remote future, we stand for immediate mutual understanding and joint action, wherever and whenever possible, from now for our mutual interests and for the freedom of India, Burma and indeed all Asia.” (Aung San 1971:86) In September 1945, Ho Chi Minh spoke of his interest in the creation of a “pan-Asiatic community” comprising Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaya, Burma, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. (China, Japan, and Korea were not included in Ho’s vision of an Asiatic community). (Goscha, 1999: 244) His ostensible goal at this stage was to foster political and economic cooperation among these countries while maintaining good relations with the US, France, and Britain. This was a time when Ho still hoped that the colonial powers, exhausted by war, would voluntarily speed up the process of decolonization. But when this proved to be a false hope, Ho and other Southeast Asian nationalist leaders began considering the use of regional cooperation to oppose the return of European colonialism. This was clearly evident in Ho’s letter to the Indonesian Prime Minister, Sutan Sjahrir, in November 1946 urging cooperation between the two countries to advance their common struggle for freedom. In this letter, Ho asked Indonesia to join him in getting India, Burma, and Malaya to develop initiatives toward a “Federation of Free Peoples of Southern Asia.” But Indonesian leaders responded coolly to this idea, apparently worried that cooperating with the Vietnamese communists would give the Dutch an opportunity to use the fear of communism to delay Indonesia’s own independence.

Advancing decolonization was a principal theme at the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, the first conference of Asian nations in the post-war period. It was even more central to the Second Asian Relations Conference, also known as the Conference on Indonesia, which was directly and specifically geared to supporting Indonesian freedom fighters after the 2^nd Dutch Police Action in 1948. Yet, despite all the talk about pan-Asian unity, its proponents were willing to offer only political, rather than material support for the region’s independence movements. For example, India’s aid to Indonesian freedom fighters, an exception, was not extended to Ho Chih Minh, much to the disappointment of his supporters.

And these early stirrings of pan-Asianism did not translate into concrete and durable forms of cooperation or a pan-Asian institution. There was an uncomfortable sense among the smaller nations of Asia that the pan-Asianists of India, Japan and China “were primarily concerned with their own countries,” and their “exhortations… largely as an extension of their own distinctive cultures.” (Steadman, 1969, 33) Moreover, Southeast Asians saw in a pan-Asian community potential for Chinese or Indian domination. As one Burmese delegate to the 1947 Asian Relations Conference put it, “It was terrible to be ruled by a Western power, but it was even more so to be ruled by an Asian power.” (Cited in Henderson 1955) And the pan-Asian sentiments of India’s leaders were stymied by their limited contacts with nationalist leaders in other parts of Asia, their misgivings towards the Nationalist government in China, and the rise of anti-Indian sentiments in Burma and other parts of Asia (Keenleyside 1982)

While Nationalist Asia sought to channel regionalism as an instrument of anti-colonialism and national liberation, the fourth vision, Regionalist Asia, inspired those who wished to use the combined platform of the region’s newly independent nation states to seek a collective voice at the world stage. There were considerable overlap between Nationalist and Regionalist Asia, with Nehru, Aung San, Ho Chih Minh belonging to both. But the regionalists (or the regionalist side of the nationalists) went a step beyond merely securing independence from colonial rule. The logical next step to follow in the pursuit of Asianism was to seek a role in the management of regional and international affairs. As Aung San of Burma put it, “Asia has been rejuvenated and is progressively coming into world politics. Asia can no longer be ignored in international councils. Its voice grows louder and louder. You can hear it in Indonesia, you can hear it in Indo-China, you can harken to it in Burma and India and elsewhere.” (Silverstein, 1972: 101). One major example of this shift was the differences in the agendas of the Asian Relations Conferences of 1947 and 1949, and that of the Asia-Africa Conference in 1955, which, despite its hybrid name, was thoroughly dominated by the Asians. While the ARC’s fretted over support for decolonization, the 29 participants at Bandung, as its Secretary-General would put it, set out “to determine…the standards and procedures of present-day international relations,” including  “the formulation and establishment of certain norms for the conduct of present-day international relations and the instruments for the practical application of these norms.” (Abdulghani 1964: 72 &103) In other words, while the ARCs were about independence (from colonial rule), Bandung was about intervention (security from great power or superpower intervention).

The regionalists also saw the possibility of restoring the historical linkages among Asian societies disrupted by European colonialism to forge a regional association. Nehru described the first Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi as an “expression of the deeper urge of the mind and spirit of Asia which has persisted in spite of the isolationism which grew up during the years of European domination” (Nehru, 1948:23). We have seen Ho Chih Minh’s interest in a “Pan-Asiatic Community”. Immediately after the World War II, Nehru himself would advocate a regional association: “a closer union between India and South-East Asia on the one side, and Afghanistan, Iran, and the Arab world on the West.” (Cited in Keenleyside 1982:216-7).

But Southeast Asians were unnerved by the prospects for a larger Asian federation or even association.  Even professing deep friendship with India, Aung San recognized that “(w)hile India should be one entity and China another, Southeast Asia as a whole should form an entity – then, finally, we should come together in a bigger union with the participation of other parts of Asia as well.”(Cited in Vandenbosch and Butwell, 1966: 341) Southeast Asian would find subregional unity more practical and palatable. Bear in mind that Jose Rizal had advocated the unity of the Malay race, although he was appropriated by pan-Asianists. Frustrated by the failure of his efforts to secure material aid from fellow Asian countries for his struggle against the French, Ho Chi Minh would turn to the idea of an Indochinese federation. “Because of the close geography and extricable relationship in military and politics between Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the success or failure of revolutionary liberation of one country will have a direct impact on that of the others. Our task is to help the revolutionary movements in Cambodia and Laos. (Ho 1995: 82)

This Southeast Asian concern was evident at the 1947 Asian Relations Conference. Abu Hanifa, one of the Indonesian representatives to the Conference, would write later that the idea of a wholly Southeast Asian grouping was conceived at the conference in response to the belief among the Southeast Asian delegates that the larger states, India and China, could not be expected to support their nationalist cause. At the meeting, delegates from Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaya “debated, talked, [and] planned a Southeast Asian Association closely cooperating first in cultural and economic matters. Later, there could be perhaps be a more closely knit political cooperation. Some of us even dreamt of a Greater Southeast Asia, a federation.” (Goscha, 1999:255)

But the legacy of Nationalist Asia was too strong and enduring to permit any quick and easy fulfillment of these early efforts at Regionalist Asia, even at the subregional level. These efforts were at best intended to strengthen, not weaken the autonomy of the nation state. ASEAN, as Singapore’s Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam would put it, was intended to serve and strengthen the national interest, not to dilute or compromise it.

Asia Between Universalism and Exceptionalism

We have seen that the different conceptions of Asia gave rise to different regionalisms in the early post-War period. As Regionalist Asia continued to compete with Nationalist Asia for the support of Asia’s new political elite, there would emerge a fifth conception of Asia, which might be termed Exceptionalist Asia.

In the 1960s, post-Bandung, Southeast Asia took the lead in developing regionalism. The leadership of India and China had ended - India’s because of internal distractions, rivalry with Pakistan, ironically a member of the Colombo Powers fraternity which had collectively sponsored the Bandung gathering, and China’s because its violation of its own pledge of noninterference given at the Bandung (one of the 10 principles of the Bandung Declaration). Most important, the Sino-Indian war undermined the claims of both to jointly lead Asia. In the meantime, Japan remained mired in the legacy of its imperial record, hesitant to launch new regional initiatives, especially with a political and security purpose. Southeast Asia itself was itself divided and prone to conflict, both domestic and inter-state (especially with Sukarno’s Konfrontasi against newly formed Malaysia. Its first attempt to create a regional body, ASA, founded in 1960, failed because it did not include Southeast Asia’s biggest player, Indonesia. A second body, Maphilindo, (Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia), premised on the notion of the unity of the Malay race, and thus recalling Jose Rizal’s identification of Philippines as a Malay nation, also collapsed over escalating tensions between Indonesia and Malaysia, as Sukarno called into question, with the military force, the legitimacy of the Malaysian federation.

Yet, even the subregional efforts were held by an underlying conception of Asianness. Thus despite being an association of Southeast Asia, ASA’s proponents saw themselves as part of a larger Asian cultural, political, and economic context. For Thai Foreign Minister and a key architect of ASA, Thanat Khoman, ASA was rooted in “Asian culture and traditions” (sic). Describing ASA as an example of “Asian mutual co-operation”, he argued: “For Asian solidarity must be and will be forged by Asian hands and the fact that our three countries: the Federation of Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand, have joined hands in accomplishing this far-reaching task cannot be a mere coincidence.”(Association of Southeast Asia, 1962:33)

After these false starts, one segment of Southeast Asia, comprising Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore, finally held together to create Asia’s first viable multipurpose regional organization: ASEAN. But even by then a more powerful force, of regionalization in the sense defined above was to emerge in parallel with Southeast Asia’s search for unity and identity. This was the idea of a Pacific (later Asia-Pacific) community. Proposed by Japanese and Australian academics, and driven by the high economic growth and interdependence among the industrial economies of the Pacific Rim, the idea of a Pacific Community finally gave Japan a platform to enter the fray of Regionalist Asian, albeit at first through epistemic communities and semiofficial groupings like Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC, founded 1967), Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD, 1968) and Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC, 1980). But initially this was an Asia-Pacific construct, not Asia. Key roles in developing it belonged to individuals, think-tanks and governments, not just from Japan, but from outside Asia, especially from Australia and the US. But the Pacific Community idea gradually morphed into the Asia-Pacific (or Asia Pacific) idea, largely due to the need to involve ASEAN members who were deeply suspicious of the project as a move to marginalise the developing nations, and with an eye to China’s future incorporation. ASEAN’s consent and endorsement was necessary to make it work.

The Asia-Pacific idea would in 1989 lead to the first region wide inter-governmental institution (outside the ESCAP and ADB), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. Its purpose was not to develop a EU like supranational body. But neither was it geared to, a la, Nationalist Asia, anticolonial, or anti-western objectives. By now, those objectives had receded into the historical background. The new agenda of regionalism was interdependence, not independence. The driver was not anticolonial sentiments, but the quest for growth and dynamism. Although no direct evidence can be provided linking regionalism of the Pacific or Asia-Pacific variety with the region’s economic growth (it would be the other way around), there was little question that the idea behind it reflected economic performance and optimism for the future. Moreover, what started as a effort defined mainly in Pacific terms became one in which the Asian element would grow to be the more prominent one.

While Regionalist Asia persisted, it was joined by a somewhat newer vision of Asia, a fifth vision which may be termed Exceptionalist Asia. It was the product of the phenomenal economic growth enjoyed by some of Asia’s economies. Claims about Asia’s distinctiveness were always around, but they were largely the product of Western Orientalism, which imagined Asia to be exotic, romantic, and subservient. A new form of exceptionalism, constructed by Asia’s own power elite, came in to the fore in the 1990s, grounded in claims and assertions about how Asian culture might underpin its economic success. Proponents of Exceptionalist Asia were of course not averse to globalization. They actually thrived on its economic benefits, although uncomfortable with its political aspects, especially the spread of human rights and democracy. The term Asian values emerged in the 1990s in parallel with the high growth of East Asian economies, such as Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. This led some commentators, such as Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, to associate economic performance with cultural traits and habit. While Lee initially spoke of Confucian values, it latter morphed into Asian Values. The list of Asian values varies, but generally includes hard work, thrift (high savings rate), emphasis on education, consensus, rejection of extreme individualism, national teamwork, and respect for authority. The term acquired a political connotation when critics viewed some elements of it, such as respect for authority, as a justification for authoritarian rule. (Sen, 1997; The Economist, 28 May 1994, pp.13-14)  Critics argued that what passed as Asian values was in no way special or unique to Asian societies, and that the sheer political and cultural diversity of Asia could permit no such generalization about a set of commonly-held values across the region.  How can one speak of a coherent set of values that can be uniquely “Asian”, and ignore the differences between Confucian, Muslim and Hindu cultural norms. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 dealt a blow to the Asian Values concept, when its proponents, Lee Kuan Yew included, admitted that there could be “bad” Asian values, such as corruption and lack of transparency and accountability.

Coinciding with the emergence of Exceptionalist Asia, and partly deriving from it, a new form of regionalism challenged the hitherto Asia-Pacific movement of “open regionalism”, setting up a contest of sorts between APEC and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed’s East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG, renamed Caucus, EAEC). (Higgott and Stubbs 1995) Following the 1997 Asian crisis, the idea of an East Asian Community gained momentum. Its advocates saw “East Asia as a “crucial and distinctive region in the world”, economically more integrated and politically and culturally more coherent than unwieldy Asia-Pacific forums like ARF and APEC that include the US, Canada and Australia. At 54% of the region’s total trade, compared to 35% in 1980, intra-East Asian trade was higher than that in the NAFTA region (46%), and “very much comparable to intra-regional trade in the European Union before the 1992 Maastricht treaty.” (Kuroda 2005)It is thus East Asia that offers the best hopes for a “bona fide regional community with shared challenges, common aspirations and a parallel destiny” and for the development of a “strong sense of regional identity and…consciousness.” (East Asia Vision Group 2001: 2, 6, 24)

So far, East Asian regionalism has turned out to be less exclusivist than initially anticipated, thanks partly to persisting transpacific trade and security dependence with the US and concern for a rising China dominating such an East Asia-only construct. The inaugural East Asian Summit in 2005 took a functional rather than geographic view of East Asia by giving a seat at the table to India, Australia and New Zealand. Now it seems US and Russia would be be invited as well. But whether the non-East Asians would be assured of equal status within the East Asian Community, or being part of the core group who could drive the community building process, remains to be seen. Should the ‘purist’ (Han 2005:147) view of East Asia prevail, these nations would have good reason to be unhappy over their “second-class” status. And while the broadening of the EAS might have dispelled fears of Chinese dominance, this could engender Chinese disinterest in the summit process. The key challenge for East Asian visionaries and leaders would be to find the balance between Chinese dominance and Chinese disinterest.

In the meantime, echoes of Exceptionalist Asia can be heard in the “Rising Asia” discourse inspired by the massive economic growth, military build-up and attendant political clout of China and to a lesser extent India. While Nationalist Asia spoke of Asia’s emancipation and reemergence from Western dominance, often in spiritual and moral terms, Rising Asia proponents speak to the possibility of Asia displacing the West from its perch of global leadership. How the Asian powers might cooperate to create a common Asian home, much less an Asian powerhouse, remains unclear in the Rising Asia discourse. (Acharya 2010)

The exceptionalists, realizing the region’s sheer dependence on economic globalization, are likely to keep their regionalism relatively open. Moreover, the emerging transnational civil society in Asia seems more firmly wedded to the universalist values of human rights, democracy and increasingly the environment, which could keep under check the exceptionalists’ urge to “Asianize” or truncate these values. Hence, the Asia that we may see in the coming decades may well be shaped by the contestations and compromises between Universalist Asia and Exceptionalist Asia. In the meantime, some fear that before the contest is settled, Imperialist Asia, with support and sustenance from Exceptionalist Asia, especially from within China itself, might take over and fundamentally reshape the Asian order in the 21^st century. This will happen if China continues with it relentless rise and imposes a Monroe Doctrine like sphere over its neighbours. The best hope against this would be the strengthening of Regionalist Asia. But as yet, limitations of Regionalist Asia abound. Asian regional institutions are still sovereignty bound, unwilling and unable to undertake any major role in conflict resolution. The doctrine of non-interference still remains sacred. It will take time to change these underpinnings of Nationalist Asia for a truly Regionalist Asia to take over.

To conclude, as a scholar of international relations, I am in general agreement with Duara that a prominent place in the construction of Asia has to be given to regionalism and regionalization. It is heartening to see regionalism and regionalization, which are sometimes thought of as a preserve of political scientists, being viewed as a seriously helpful tool in analyzing the concept of Asia by scholars from other fields in social sciences and humanities. Without regionalism, I argue, there might not even be any idea of Asia for us to talk about. Speaking of the idea of Asia, Rebecca Karl shows that “far from always meaning the same thing or even including the same configurations of peoples and states, it has been mobilized for very different purposes at different times.” (Karl 1998: 1118) Similarly, regionalism in Asia has not been a singular or coherent set of beliefs. Nor has it been an unchanging phenomenon. It has incorporated and contributed to different conceptions of the region in different times, sustaining Asia’s diversity and pointing to alternative futures.

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[1] Duara (2010) distinguishes between “region” and “regionalization”, taking the former to mean “the relatively unplanned or evolutionary emergence of an area of inter-action and inter-dependence,”, and the latter as “the more active, often ideologically-driven political process of creating a region”. While this is a valid distinction, it risks obscuring (although it is subsumed under “regionalization”) the concept and practice of regionalism. Indeed, regionalization and regionalism can be analytically separated. The former is normally understood in the political economy literature as market-driven, as opposed to state-led, advance of transnational economic linkages, including trade, investment and production. Hence a relevant term here is the “regionalization of production” in East Asia, which was spurred by the southward movement of Japanese companies and capital following the reevaluation of the Yen after the Plaza Accord of 1985, thereby bringing South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries under the its ambit and creating a de facto economic region of East Asia. (Bernard and Ravenhill 1995) Regionalism, as understood in political science/international relations literature, implies the deliberate act of forging a common platform, including new inter-governmental organizations and transnational civil society networks, to deal with common challenges, realize common objectives and articulate/advance a common identity. While much of this can be subsumed under regionalization in the sense that Duara speaks of, regionalization can proceed in the absence “the more active, often ideologically-driven political process of creating a region”, especially when the latter entails formal regional institutions. Asia was far into the process of economic interdependence and transnational production networks before the first formal intergovernmental regional economic grouping, APEC, was created in 1989. But it is regionalism which brings the notion of Asia alive.

[2] I have argued elsewhere that regions should be understood in terms of: (1) material and ideational: --- regionalist ideas and regional identity that move the study of regions beyond purely materialist understandings; (2) whole and parts--- regional (as opposed to mainly country-specific) perspective based on a marriage between disciplinary and area-studies approaches; (3) past and present--- historical understanding of regions, going beyond contemporary policy issues; (4) inside and outside--- internal construction of regions, stressing the role of local agency, as opposed to external stimuli or the naming of regions by external powers; and (5) permanence and transience--- the fluidity, “porosity” and transience of regions. (Acharya 2011)

The Idea of Asia

"There are two powerful myths about Asia that plague any debate over whether it exists as a region. One treats Asia as essentially an outsider's invention. The other conflates it with the "rise of Asia". Both are misleading, the latter even more so than the former......."         
Read More:
http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/ap9/AP9_B_AsiaTrainRT.pdf

Book Launch: Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (2nd Edn)

ASEAN Secretariat Press Release
Launched: ASEAN Secretariat Policy Forum
ASEAN Secretariat, 14 July 2009
http://www.aseansec.org/PR-Launch-ASEANSecretariatPolicyForum.pdf
http://www.routledge.com/books/Constructing-a-Security-Community-in-Southeast-Asia-isbn9780415414296

The ASEAN Secretariat Policy Forum – a platform for a larger reach of people to be involved in the activities of the Secretariat – was formally launched at the ASEAN Secretariat today. To be held regularly, the Forum is envisaged to draw prominent speakers to share ideas and insights with the public on issues relevant to the work of the Secretariat. The Forum takes the place of the previous ASEC Brown Bag Series.

In launching the Forum, Dr Surin Pitsuwan, the Secretary-General of ASEAN, said that the ASEAN Secretariat was aware that policy matters were the purview and the space for the political leadership – the ASEAN Leaders and the Ministers. He stressed, however, that it remained incumbent upon the Secretariat to look at the horizon to see what the issues that could be policy issues of ASEAN were, so when it reaches the level of the Leaders and the Ministers, the Secretariat would be prepared for their deliberation and bring the decision down to the implementation level. “We just want to be prepared to be their good instrument of policy implementation,” he highlighted.

The first speaker of the Forum was Prof. Amitav Acharya, Professor of International Affairs at the School of International Service at the American University in Washington D.C., who spoke on “Reconstructing ASEAN: Challenges for the 21st Century”. His address tracked how ASEAN had witnessed momentous changes to its membership, institutional structure and role from the early years until today with the development of an ASEAN Community and the adoption of the ASEAN Charter. He stressed that there was a need to ensure that the initiatives of the past were fully implemented and the provisions complied with. He said that the region’s future credibility depends on how it carried out the goals and priorities it had set out for itself.

His lecture was followed by a panel session comprising Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Research Professor and Deputy Chair for Social Sciences and Humanities at The Indonesian Institute of Sciences, and the Director for Programme and Research at The Habibie Centre in Jakarta; Prof. Dato’ Dr Zakaria Ahmad, Distinguished Fellow of the Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College; and Dr Rizal Sukma, the Executive Director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta. A Q&A session followed the panel session.

The Forum concluded with the launching of Prof. Acharya’s latest book, “Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, 2nd ed. (http://www.routledge.com/books/Constructing-a-Security-Community-in-Southeast-Asia-isbn9780415414296) The book, in offering a comprehensive evaluation of the reconstructed ASEAN, reviews a decade of new developments and argues that ASEAN remains indispensable to the security of Southeast Asia, and will continue to play a major role in the wider Asia-Pacific security. Prof. Acharya is also the Chair of the ASEAN Studies Center at the American University. The Center was formally established on 1 July 2009. It is the first ASEAN Studies Center in the United States. The Center is part of American University’s School of International Service, the largest and one of the oldest schools of international relations in the US.

Islam and the East

Interview with Riz Khan, Al-Jazeera TV, 18 Nov 2009

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&source=hp&q=Amitav+Acharya%2C+Riz+Khan&rlz=1R2RNTN_enUS363&aq=f&aqi=&oq=

Islamic movements have been growing in the countries of Southeast Asia for decades.

In the Philippines, the Muslim struggle for independence in the southern region of Mindanao has cost 120,000 lives and displaced millions. Attempts for a peaceful resolution have stalled.

Some of Thailand's 2.2 million Muslims have taken up arms as well, demanding independence for the southern - traditionally Muslim -part of the country.

And in Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim country, Islamists lost seats in elections earlier this year, but militant groups continue their bombing attacks against Western targets.

One US politician, Republican senator Christopher Bond, says the region could be a testing ground for the future of Muslim-Western relations. In his new book, The Next Front: Southeast Asia and the Road to Global Peace with Islam, he warns that the US could "end up fighting Islamist radicals on a second front".

He urges the Obama administration to reverse decades of neglect of the region by launching "soft-power" initiatives - diplomatic and economic tools, along with personal outreach.

So what is the state of the Islamic movements in Southeast Asia? And do they pose a threat to the West? Is the branding of the region as a "second front" counterproductive? And can "soft power" initiatives improve relations between the Muslim world and the US?

On Wednesday, Riz speaks with Bond, the vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Amitav Acharya, the chair of the ASEAN Studies Centre at American University, and previously headed research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

Robert Hefner, the director of the Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs at Boston University, and president of the Association for Asian Studies. Since the mid-1980s, Hefner has conducted research on Muslim culture, politics and education.

This episode of the Riz Khan show can be seen live on Wednesday, November 18, 2009 at 2030GMT with repeats on Thursday at 0030GMT, 0530GMT and 1130GMT.

From: http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/rizkhan/2009/11/20091118103211283864.html


You can watch the full interview in two parts:
Part I: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J_pI5VJk1_I&feature=related
Part II: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iObnEy7ths4)

Book Launch: Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism

October 8, 2009

Dr. Amitav Acharya discusses Asia regionalism at the East-West Center in Washington
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/ewc-in-washington/events/previous-events-2009/october-8-dr-amitav-acharya/

(Washington D.C.) October 8– Asian nations do not passively adopt foreign concepts of regionalism but instead adapt them to serve the unique needs of the region. In an East-West Center in Washington Asia Pacific Security Seminar, Dr. Amitav Acharya, professor of international relations in the School of International Service at American University, introduced his new book Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/cup_detail.taf?ti_id=5347) in which he examines Asian regionalism from the viewpoint of Asian actors.

Dr. Acharya pointed to a long history of the adaption of outside ideas in local Asian communities. For example, Southeast Asia imported Buddhism from India and China along with religious art and architecture. However, temples, paintings, and statues associated with Buddhism in Southeast Asia are quite different in appearance from the original Chinese and Indian sources; in each instance, the ideas from outside were modified by local craftsmen who created a distinctively local take on a foreign concept. As with ancient art, foreign ideas of regional institution building were not passively acquired, but were adapted with modification by regional actors. The foreign concepts, Dr. Acharya explained, did not make local ideas go extinct. Rather, local actors synthesized outside concepts of regionalism with local ideas to create a new concept of regional interaction unique to Asia.

Dr. Acharya explained that Asian institutions tend to focus less on the creation of material concepts, such as power and money, and more on the normative sharing of ideas. These institutions are not designed to be problem-solving mechanisms like the institutions of other regions. Further, he noted that while many Western institutions are interested in collective security, Asian institutions are more focused on common security and tend to avoid humanitarian intervention activities.

Dr. Acharya also pointed out that no Asian great player has ever successfully dominated any regional grouping in Asia. He explained that Asian nations are uninterested in institutions where one or two major countries hold most of the power, instead preferring groupings where each nation, regardless of size or power, has an equal voice. He noted that this makes Chinese attempts to create a China-dominated organization in Asia unlikely to succeed: while Asian institutions need Chinese involvement to be viable, local Asian actors will not join an organization where China holds all the power.

Thus, Asian actors adapted Western ideas to best suit the needs of the local populations, creating a distinctively Asian version of regional architecture. Civilizations, Dr. Acharya argued, learn from each other, adapting foreign ideas through creative synthesis with local ideas to create new and unique concepts, allowing the local and the foreign to grow together.

For Video Link:
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/ewc-in-washington/events/previous-events-2009/october-8-dr-amitav-acharya/

The APEC Summit: A Future for Transpacific Regionalism?

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2009
Time: 2:00 PM — 4:00 PM
Location: Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

President Obama will soon attend his first Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders' summit in Singapore, underscoring U.S. engagement and commitment to the region. Unlike other regional institutions, the APEC forum provides an opportunity for the United States to participate in the policy dialogue of a dynamic, economically-diverse region of the world. This year's agenda includes significant attention to the current economic climate and to the reinforcement of the G20 summit measures for economic growth and recovery. Japan, the United States' most important ally in Asia, is set to host the 2010 APEC summit. The 2011 meeting will take place in the United States, providing the Obama administration with an excellent opportunity to shape the APEC agenda and ensure American influence in the region in the years to come. Will the Obama administration use this opportunity to define a U.S. trade policy? Can the new administrations in Tokyo and Washington work together to set a regional agenda? Will the United States be able to create and assume a central role in APEC despite increased momentum toward an "Asian community"?

At this event, Matthew Goodman, senior adviser to the under secretary of state for economic affairs; international trade expert Jeffrey J. Schott, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics; Amitav Acharya of American University; and AEI resident scholars Claude Barfield and Michael Auslin will discuss the importance and impact of the APEC summit, as well as long-term U.S. policy and interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

For more and video link, visit: http://www.aei.org/event/100163

OBAMA FROM A SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE

THE SIGUR CENTER FOR ASIAN STUDIES
Elliot School of Internaitonal Affairs
The George Washington University
Lecture on the Series on:
Power and Identity in Asia
November 12, 2009

Given President Barack Obama’s Southeast
Asian ties and his visit to Asia, Amitav
Acharya, in a lecture at the Sigur Center for
Asian Studies, discussed Southeast Asian
perspectives of Obama. His analysis incorporates
discussions from both official and
non-official sectors of Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand. More specifically,
Acharya examines two questions:

1. How do Southeast Asians view Obama
as a person and as a president?

2. How has Obama’s election been
viewed; how has it affected

Read More at: http://www.gwu.edu/~power/assets/docs/Acharya%20November%202009%20Asia%20Report.pdf

Asian Dreams: Can A Divided Region Lead the World?

(published as: "China, India, Japan: Who Will Speak for Asia?" Canada-Asia Viewpoints, November 30, 2009. http://www.asiapacific.ca/editorials/canada-asia-viewpoints/editorials/china-india-japan-who-will-speak-asia)

Amitav Achraya

Washington, D.C. President Obama heads to Asia to attend the annual summit of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Singapore on 13-15 November, and visit several other Asian capitals. Among his interlocutors in Asia would be the leaders of two Asian nations who have staked a claim to global leadership. China is leading the charge, Japan is not far behind. India, a third contender, will not be represented at the Singapore summit (it’s not an APEC member), and Obama is not going to Delhi on this trip. But on 24 November, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh becomes the first foreign visitor to enter the Obama White House on a state visit.

Asia is rising, and the Asian dream of global eminence is clearly visible, but can China, India and Japan offer leadership to Asia and the world? The debate over Asia’s role in global institutions is in full swing now.

India, Japan and China are part of the G-20, the much talked about forum that symbolizes the transition to the “post-American world”. But Asians, while not lacking in money or manpower, do not agree among themselves as to who represents Asia and what is the best way of dislodging the West from the perch of global leadership.

Let’s begin with the idea of a G-2, an imagined condominium or sorts between China and the US that may actually reflect the global distribution of power in the 21st century. Accepting a G-2 would mean accepting China as the power to represent Asia. But neither Japanese nor the Indians would hear of it.

China has only itself to blame for this. It opposes Japan and India taking up a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, which in many respects remains the true seat of global power.

Japan for its part has been less than enthusiastic about the G-20, seeing a threat to the G-8 forum where it, and not China, is represented. Last July, on the occasion of the St. Petersburg G-8 meeting, the then LDP-led Japanese government strongly defended the G-8 as a more homogenous group of industrial democracies, with a set of common values (forgetting Russia of course). As a government spokesman put it: “…would you call China a democracy? Could a Group of 20 have a meaningful discussion in 60 minutes?”

US, Japan and Australia have promoted the idea of an Alliance of Democracies, which might also involve India and Indonesia. But this is sure to divide Asia and infuriate China, whose 1. 3 billion people remain under communist party rule that shows no sign of sharing power with the people.
In the meantime, Asian countries have been put on the defensive on global issues such as climate change, more busy blaming the West for high carbon emissions than coming up with new ideas to ensure global environmental protection. When pressed, the best India could come up with is to promise not to exceed the carbon emissions levels of Western countries, arguing that if the West brings down its carbon emissions, it can set a lower target for India.

As Amartya Sen, Asia’s preeminent contemporary philosopher, asks: “Has Asia been doing enough in leading the world opinion on how to manage, and in particular not to mismanage, the global challenges we face today, including that of terrorism, violence and global injustice?”

The answer sadly could only be no, not enough. This is not surprising, since Asians cannot agree over who should lead Asia, how can they agree on who should lead the world?

Of course, India, China and Japan all are busy redefining their international roles. The Chinese speak of their “peaceful rise”, insisting that China’s growing economic and military power need not lead to conflict or expansion, but peacefully integration into the international system. The Japanese are pursuing the idea of becoming a “normal state”, an idea first proposed by Ichiro Ozawa of the Democratic Party of Japan (Japan’s current ruling party) in the early 1990s. As the Japanese see it, being normal means shedding some of the constitutional restrictions on its military deployments so as that Japan can participate more fully in UN-led peacekeeping missions abroad. But what the Japanese see as normalization, the Chinese see as neo-nationalism and militarization. And India has moved from old Nehruvian idealism to what noted commentator C. Raja Mohan calls a “Curzonian” (after British Viceroy Lord Curzon) foreign policy which acknowledges Indian centrality in Asian geopolitics.

But none of these are ideas about global governance or leadership, but are more of self-serving attempts to carve out and legitimize the growing power and clout of these nations in regional and world affairs.

What about Asian regional groups? Led by ASEAN, groups like ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Plus Three do offer a forum for intra-regional dialogue and confidence-building that is valuable. The region is better off with them and without them. But they have not served as platforms for generating new ideas about global governance. It’s about time they started building an Asian consensus on who leads them over what issues so as to make a meaningful contribution to the reform and strengthening of global institutions.

In the meantime, one regional forum that looks more and more dispensable in recent years is the annual APEC summit, the very reason for Obama’s November date with Asia. Originally proposed by Australia and where the US has been a founding member, APEC has done little to fulfill is original goal of advancing free trade. But it has achieved little. Its free trade mission has long been overtaken by other multilateral and bilateral initiatives, like the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area. India remains outside of APEC, making the forum’s relevance to Asian security and prosperity highly questionable. The need to attend an APEC summit every year makes it difficult for an American president to join the East Asian Summit (in which India is a member). APEC should be shut down, although its secretariat can be turned into a clearing house of economic data for the region and regional training center. The US should join the East Asian Summit, but only if Asian nations show serious purpose about turning it into a meaningful regional forum for resolving regional issues and reforming global leadership.

http://www.asiapacific.ca/editorials/canada-asia-viewpoints/editorials/china-india-japan-who-will-speak-asia